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Abstract
We quantify to what extent the quality of credit rating predictions improves
through integrating measures of corporate social performance (CSP) in an
established credit risk model. We provide comprehensive evidence of the
comparative informational advantage of considering CSP in predicting credit
ratings of North American and European firms. In the North American sam-
ple both environmental and social performance have an explanatory impact.
The out-of-sample prediction quality is improved by more than 0.8%. By
contrast, only the social performance increases the explanatory power in the
European sample while environment performance does not. Overall, we show
that CSP is a relevant variable for predicting credit ratings. In general, our
findings support the risk mitigation view of CSP indicating that firms with
high CSP are less risky and thus have better credit ratings. However, ob-
viously the quality of the relationship depends on the socio-economical and
cultural environment as well, as can be seen from the di↵ering results in
North America and Europa.
Keywords: Credit risk, Credit ratings prediction, Corporate social
performance,, Risk mitigation
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• Measures of corporate social responsibility improve credit rating pre-
diction quality
• Firms with high corporate social responsibility have better credit rat-
ings
• Impact on credit ratings is more pronounced in North America than in
Europe
This paper analyzes whether, how, and to what extent the prediction
quality of a firm’s credit rating can be improved by integrating its corporate
social performance (CSP) in the forecasting model. To capture regional dif-
ferences, we analyze two samples of firm-level data, one of North American
and one of European firms. We unify the work of Jiraporn et al. (2014) for
North America and Stellner et al. (2015) for Europe by providing a frame-
work in which results for the two regions can validly be compared in an
established credit risk model. We use CSP measures of the globally avail-
able Asset4 framework and investigate the impact of these CSP measures
on both the explanation and the prediction of credit ratings. We capture
region specific di↵erences by estimating models for both North America and
Europe separately and for a merged data set. In particular, we apply a
two-stage approach with an estimation of credit risk models including CSP
variables in a first stage and an out-of-sample analysis using the estimate of
stage one to predict the credit ratings in a second stage. Finally, we measure
the prediction quality by comparing predicted and actual credit ratings. In
North America, the environmental and social CSP show explanatory impact
on credit ratings while only the social CSP is relevant in Europe. Further,
we find improved predicting power of the credit risk model using CSP scores
for the North American sample while we document no improvement in the
European sample.
In theory, corporate social responsibility, which is constantly addressed
in this paper through the more narrow, however measurable concept of CSP,
can co-exist with both better and worse credit ratings, providing there is
evidence of an impact. According to Goss and Roberts (2011), there are
two contrary views for the impact of CSP: The risk-mitigation view and the
over-investment view. According to the risk-mitigation view, a firm with high
CSP faces lower risks than a firm with a low CSP if all other aspects of these
firms are comparable. High CSP preserves firms from legal, reputational,
and regulatory risks (Bauer and Hann, 2010), allows firms to hire better
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qualified employees (Turban and Greening, 1997), and lowers agency risks
(Oikonomou et al., 2014). The opposite, the over-investment view regards
investments in CSP as a waste of scarce resources. An increase in fixed costs
related to sustainable investments in CSP increases the volatility of earnings
and thus the default risk (Frooman et al., 2008). With the exception of
the environment score in Europe, credit ratings are significant positively
correlated with the CSP scores and thus our findings are consistent with the
risk-mitigation view.
Whether CSP adds informational power to the explanation of credit rat-
ings has been the subject of two recent studies, namely Jiraporn et al. (2014)
analyzing North America and Stellner et al. (2015) analyzing Europe. These
studies provide inconsistent evidence that could be either due to the di↵er-
ent methodological designs or the di↵ering regional focus in their samples.
To be more precise, Stellner et al. (2015) show that CSP has no impact on
credit ratings in Europe while Jiraporn et al. (2014) conclude that CSP does,
in fact, have an impact on credit ratings in North America. Nevertheless,
these results are inappropriate for concluding that regional di↵erences exist
since both studies use di↵erent model specifications and concepts for mea-
suring CSP (data provider Asset4 resp. Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD)).
In particular, Asset4 and KLD CSP data show major di↵erences, even after
adjustment for di↵erent CSP definitions (Chatterji et al., 2016; Dorfleitner
et al., 2015). Asset4 provides a comprehensive calculation of the scores based
on more than 750 indicators which are ordinal or metric compared with KLD,
with only using a binary rating system reflecting CSP strengths and concerns
for U.S. firms (Humphrey et al., 2012). We use CSP measures of Asset4 due
to their global coverage that allows for a consistent estimation of an well-
established credit risk model for North America and Europe. The major
limitation of the existing studies in the CSP–credit rating context concerns
the retrospective contemplation by measuring the correlation of credit rat-
ings and lagged CSP which lacks of out-of-sample predictions. In our study,
we predict the next period’s credit rating based on all available information
at a certain point in time. Finally the prediction quality is determined by
comparing actual and predicted credit ratings.
Our data set includes S&P counterparty ratings, which we match with
Asset4 CSP scores and a set of control variables. We estimate several versions
of an established ordered probit credit risk model, which is able to handle
rating migrations. To be specific, we estimate one baseline model without
CSP factors and three CSP model for each sample (i.e., the North American
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sample, the European sample, and the merged sample comprising both),
resulting in a total of twelve model specifications. The three CSP model
specifications comprise one aggregated CSP measure (ES) model, a model
specification including a score for the environmental dimension of CSP, and
a model specification with a score for the social dimension of CSP. The
in-sample period for determining the models’ coe cients ranges for credit
ratings from 2003 to 2013. Subsequently, we predict credit ratings on the
data set covering the years from 2014 to 2017. This two-step-process ensures
that only the available level of information is used to predict the following
periods’ credit ratings.
We find that the integration of measures for CSP in the credit risk model
increase its explanatory power in the North American sample. The qual-
ity of out-of-sample credit rating predictions is improved by 0.8%. For the
European firms, only high social performance is correlated to better credit
ratings. The prediction quality experiences no improvement. Distinct find-
ings for North America and Europe result from the geographical, social, and
political environment of the two regions, which is reflected in the Asset4
scores. The average level of CSP scores of North American firms is lower and
their variance is higher than that of European firms. This is one possible
reason for CSP scores having a higher explanatory power in predicting credit
ratings in North America since the explanatory variables show a certain de-
gree of variance there. In a nutshell, CSP has an impact on credit ratings in
both regions although to a di↵erent extent. For North America, our findings
are consistent with those of Jiraporn et al. (2014), while our results suggest
contrasting implications to those of Stellner et al. (2015).
Our findings reveal valuable insights for researchers, debt holders, and
debt issuers. Based on our approach of incorporating CSP into credit risk
models, we find that debt holders experience higher accuracy in their credit
rating predictions if they include CSP factors as explanatory variables in their
credit risk models. With the higher prediction power they profit twofold by
preventing misjudgments: In the case of overestimation of risk, they could
lose business due to excessive price-setting. In the case of underestimation
of risk, the applied pricing does not cover the anticipated risk. This leads to
immediate losses in the risk-adjusted performance measurement and material
losses when risks become imminent. Finally, debt issuers can improve their
credit rating prediction and hence their cost of debt by increasing their CSP.
For instance, an increase in the ES score by one standard deviation for a BBB-
rated North American firm results in average savings of 14.5 basis points.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the related
literature and discuss theoretical concepts in Section 2. Section 3 describes
the data set and Section 4 introduces the employed methodology. Section 5
presents the empirical results followed by Section 6 with a discussion of the
findings and Section 7 with robustness tests. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2. Theoretical considerations
Our study is based on two streams of literature: First, the one on the
impact of CSP on credit ratings and, second, the strand on the regional
di↵erences regarding the attitude of firms towards CSP.
2.1. The impact of CSP on credit ratings
From a theoretical perspective, an indirect link between CSP and credit
ratings in the context of financing cost and corporate financial performance
(CFP) exists. There is evidence to suggest that firms with high CSP have
lower financing costs in terms of both cost of equity and cost of debt (Goss
and Roberts, 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). As cred-
itworthiness is negatively related to interest rates payable on debt (Kisgen,
2006), we expect to observe a positive relationship between CSP and credit
ratings based on this consideration. From this perspective, CSP can be seen,
as being an underlying factor, having an impact on both financing cost and
credit ratings. With respect to single CSP pillars, the negative relation-
ship between CSP and financing cost is shown for environmental (Schneider,
2011; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008) and social performance (Chen et al.,
2011). A similar path of argumentation can be formulated when consider-
ing CFP as opposed to financing costs. CSP is positively related to CFP
(Kang et al., 2016; Dorfleitner et al., 2018; Von Arx and Ziegler, 2014) in
the sense of sustainable future cash flows. Furthermore, CFP is positively
related to creditworthiness (Standard&Poor’s, 2013). Finally, firms with a
high CSP tend to have a lower idiosyncratic risk due to the risk-mitigation
e↵ect of CSP, which corresponds to both lower financing costs and a higher
CFP (Orlitzky, 2008). Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between
CSP and creditworthiness. When re-examining the di↵erent pillars of CSP,
we can expose the underlying mechanisms. Firms with a low level of en-
vironment performance face legal, reputation, and regulatory risks (Bauer
and Hann, 2010). Moreover, a good social performance allows firms to hire
5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568191
better qualified employees, thus being a key factor for future success (Tur-
ban and Greening, 1997). It should be noted that a contrasting view, the
over-investment, exists, according to which CSP lowers CFP when costs ex-
ceed additional positive returns (Brammer and Millington, 2008; Cornell and
Shapiro, 1987; Aupperle et al., 1985). However, there is less supporting evi-
dence in favor of this view.
From the empirical perspective, a few studies examine the impact of CSP
on credit ratings by approaching an ordered response credit risk model and
show that CSP is positively related to (good) credit ratings. Stellner et al.
(2015) find no significant relationship between CSP and credit ratings in
the Eurozone based on the Asset4 equal weighted rating score. However,
high (low) CSP results in better credit ratings if the country’s sustainability
performance is high (low). Jiraporn et al. (2014) use the KLD composite
score and find that the CSP policies of U.S. firms are a↵ected by other firms’
policies, when located in the same three-digit zip codes area. Firms with
high CSP have better credit ratings. A deeper look at single dimensions of
CSP by utilizing KLD data shows that U.S. firms with high environmental
and social performance have better credit ratings (Oikonomou et al., 2014;
Attig et al., 2013; Bauer and Hann, 2010; Bauer et al., 2009).
Although there exists empirical evidence on the general CSP-credit rating
link, it is still not clear, if there is an impact of CSP on the prediction quality.
Additionally, there is no consistent evidence on the question whether the
impact of CSP on credit ratings depends on regional di↵erences, a matter
which we treat in the next subsection.
2.2. CSP in North America and Europe
In general, CSP is higher in Europe compared with North America (or
the U.S. as its main representative). The respective explanations include the
legal origin (common law versus civil law), the deviating institutional and
political set-up, the level of economic development, the historic tendency to
liberal democracy, and the perception of stakeholders (Liang and Renneboog,
2017; Doh and Guay, 2006; Cai et al., 2016; Welford, 2005; Maignan, 2001).
In particular, the stakeholder perception is linked to the di↵ering ideologies as
defined by Lodge (1990). European countries are more closely related to the
communitarian ideology (pursuing the goal of common long-term good) while
the U.S. are subject to the individualistic ideology (pursuing individual short-
term improvements). The firms’ motivation to act in a socially responsible
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way di↵ers between these two regions depending on firm size and financial
performance (Sotorr´ıo and Sa´nchez, 2008).
CSP in the U.S. is ingrained in society while CSP is more state-oriented
in Europe. Although, historically, CSP has been driven more by concrete
corporate policies and programs which contribute to social concerns in the
U.S. compared to Europe , the rise of CSP in Europe results from incentives
for corporate engagement provided by the European Union (Matten and
Moon, 2008).
Empirical evidence shows that North America’s CSP exceeds Europe only
regarding rare aspects such as business communication (Maignan and Ral-
ston, 2002). Regarding most aspects and measurement concepts, CSP is
higher in Europe. We expect the regional di↵erences in the CSP level to
have an impact on credit ratings and their predictions in this study.
3. Data
We match S&P credit ratings of North American and European counter-
parties from Compustat with the rating universe of the sustainability rating
agency Asset4 provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream. Moreover, we use
firm-year financial and accounting data from Datastream and Worldscope
to control for well-documented influence factors on credit risk. Financial
counter-parties are excluded based on the economic sector level of Thom-
son Reuters Business Classification. Our final data set comprises a panel
including 724 North American firms (5,393 firm-year observations) and 218
European firms (1,712 firm-year observations). The North American panel
and the European panel follow the region classification of Fama and French
(2012).1
3.1. S&P Credit ratings and Asset4 CSP scores
We use S&P long-term borrower credit ratings reflecting the obligors’
creditworthiness over a long-term time horizon (greater than one year) as the
independent variable. The S&P issuer credit rating is defined as being the
1 The North American panel includes the United States and Canada while the Euro-
pean panel includes Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom according to the FTSE Country Segment classifi-
cation.
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current assessment of an obligor’s overall financial capacity to serve its debt,
i.e., its creditworthiness. The rating grades comprise AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB,
B, CCC, CC, and D, where D is assigned to obligors that are overdue in either
their interest or capital payments. Credit ratings of BBB or better are often
referred to as ‘investment grade’ while credit ratings below this threshold are
often called ‘non-investment’ or ‘speculative grade’. Standard&Poor’s (2017)
contains a detailed description of the rating methodology.
We estimate the CSP of a company through three di↵erent means: the
equal weighted ES score and its two pillar scores from the Asset4 database,
i.e., the environment score (ENV), and the social score (SOC). The Asset4
ES score reflects the overall score of a firm in a certain year. It is derived
by aggregating the two pillar scores. Asset4 publishes scores acting as exter-
nal measures for sustainable business models (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012;
Chatterji et al., 2016; Humphrey et al., 2012). These scores are based on
publicly available and traceable information, for instance websites, SEC fil-
ings such as 10-K, DEF 14A, and 10-Q, sustainability reports, media sources,
and NGO reports. To guarantee a high level of integrity of the data, every
entry is cross-checked by at least one additional analyst and by further anal-
yses through statistical tools. Therefore, using the Asset4 scores ensures
the elimination of weaknesses such as the lack of transparency in the KLD,
FTSE4Good, and Dow Jones-rating approaches (Chatterji and Levine, 2006)
as far as possible. This is due to the fact that Asset4 evaluates more than 750
individual data points. Every data point matches a single question concern-
ing the fulfillment of a specific item according to economic, environmental,
social, and governance issues. The information gathered by the answers is
aggregated in several stages to indicators, these again to pillars, and finally
to the average CSP rating. The scores are updated on an annual basis and
range from zero to 100 with a higher score indicating a higher level of CSP.
The rating universe of Asset4 even includes a firm post-bankruptcy, a merger,
and other causes of delisting. Thus the data set is free from survivorship bias.
3.2. Control variables
To capture well-documented e↵ects of predicting credit ratings, we control
for several variables. The detailed description of all of these variables is
provided in Table A.7.
Following Standard&Poor’s (2013); Merton (1974) we include three-year
averages of the operating margin, the long-term debt, the total debt, and
the interest coverage ratios. The interest coverage ratio is transformed as
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suggested by Blume et al. (1998). Since negative values can be caused either
by low interest payments or by high negative earnings, the magnitude of
negative values for interest coverage is not meaningful and therefore these
values are set to zero. The distribution of the interest coverage ratio is heavily
skewed and the marginal e↵ect of changes may be small if interest coverage
is already on a high level. Accordingly, we cap the three-year average at 100.
To capture the non-linear shape of interest coverage Cit for company i in year
t, we apply the decomposition to four sub-variables cAit, c
B
it , c
C
it , c
D
it as defined
by:
cAit c
B
it c
C
it c
D
it
if Cit 2 [0, 5) Cit 0 0 0
if Cit 2 [5, 10) 5 Cit   5 0 0
if Cit 2 [10, 20) 5 5 Cit   10 0
if Cit 2 [20, 100) 5 5 10 Cit   20 .
Furthermore, we also include market capitalization because bigger firms
tend to have superior credit ratings (Altman et al., 1977) and because Asset4
scores show a market cap dependence. Moreover, since all claims on assets
must earn the same compensation per unit of risk (Merton, 1974; Campbell
et al., 2008; Friewald et al., 2014), we also control for systematic risk (market
model beta) and idiosyncratic risk. Additionally, the dividend policy of a
firm also has an impact on credit risk (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009). As
profitable firms are less likely to default, we expect a positive correlation
between the market-to-book ratio and credit ratings and thus include market-
to-book ratio (Pa´stor and Pietro, 2003). Following DeAngelo et al. (2006),
retained earnings can be used as a proxy of a company’s life cycle phase.
Mature, stable firms are generally awarded a better rating (Fons, 1994).
Thus we also include retained earnings as control. Additionally, Tang (2009)
finds that upgraded firms have more capital expenditure than downgraded
firms. Hence, we expect a positive correlation between capital expenditure
and credit ratings. Moreover, firms with a poor credit risk profile tend to
have precautionary savings (Acharya et al., 2012), which is why we also use
the cash balance as a control. Earlier studies (Rampini and Viswanathan,
2013) document an impact of tangibility on credit risk. Furthermore, Bangia
et al. (2002) find evidence that S&P credit ratings change pro-cyclically.
Hence, we control for business-cycle e↵ects as depicted by the gross domestic
product-growth rate. We further use year dummies to control for remaining
systematic e↵ects (Elton et al., 2001). We follow Dimitrov et al. (2015) on the
9
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Table 1: This table reports on the total number of firms and observations per rating
class including the partial quantity of rating upgrades and downgrades for the samples of
North America and Europe. Both panels cover credit ratings from 2003 to 2013 for the
coe cient estimation and from 2014 to 2017 for the out-of-sample prediction. Independent
variables are lagged by one year compared with the credit ratings. We use S&P long-
term borrower credit ratings reflecting the obligors’ creditworthiness over a long-term
time horizon (greater than one year).
North America Europe
Total Upgr. Downgr. Total Upgr. Downgr.
AAA 2003-2013 49 4 0 6 1 0
2014-2017 7 3 0 0 0 0
AA 2003-2013 109 12 0 92 12 0
2014-2017 32 2 0 9 3 0
A 2003-2013 906 61 6 443 45 1
2014-2017 265 28 2 123 13 0
BBB 2003-2013 1600 62 46 535 35 18
2014-2017 599 33 11 204 6 5
BB 2003-2013 850 54 63 142 8 16
2014-2017 462 34 17 73 6 5
B 2003-2013 257 5 48 35 1 8
2014-2017 208 11 31 38 1 3
C 2003-2013 14 0 5 5 0 2
2014-2017 35 0 8 7 0 1
Total 2003-2013 3785 198 168 1258 102 45
2014-2017 1608 111 69 454 29 14
# Firms 724 218
connection that the standard model in the literature comes without industry
fixed e↵ects in our main models. The underlying idea assumes industry-
specific influence factors so far considered in the other controls. However, we
consider industry e↵ects in the robustness checks of Section 7.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
Compared to credit ratings, ES variables and controls are lagged by one
period. The estimation set contains credit ratings covering the years from
2003 through 2013 and independent variables between 2002 and 2012. Out-
of-sample predictions for credit ratings in the time period from 2014 to 2017
are based on independent variables from 2013 to 2016. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics of the credit rating variable, sorted by region (North
America vs. Europe) and sub-period (2003-2013 vs. 2014-2017). Rating
class BBB shows the largest number on observations in both regions.
For the ES score as well as for the ENV and SOC scores, both mean and
median are lower in North America than in Europe indicating weaker overall
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CSP. The standard deviation in the ES, ENV, and SOC scores is higher
in North America than in Europe. Thus, CSP shows higher variability in
North America than in Europe. The distributions of the measures for CSP
are skewed to the left. A reason for this phenomenon may be found in the
fact that companies with weak CSP ratings are less likely to provide the data
required to obtain an ES rating. Hence, the proportion of weak performance
companies in the database is less than in the basic population causing this
skewness.
The most significant regional di↵erence referring to descriptive statistics
is that the mean size of firms in the European sample is bigger than in
North America. This can be explained by the broader availability of credit
ratings of smaller firms in North America. Moreover, the macroeconomic
situation measured by the GDP growth rate shows a high degree of deviation.
While the level of GDP growth in the estimation period and the out-of-
sample period in North America is 1.6% and 2.2% respectively, the respective
numbers in Europe are 0.4% and 0.8% lower.
4. Methodology
Based on the approach of Kaplan and Urwitz (1979), its continuation by
Blume et al. (1998), and its application in many studies (e.g., Dimitrov et al.,
2015; Baghai et al., 2014; Alp, 2013; Jiang et al., 2012; Becker and Milbourn,
2011), we estimate a threshold model based on an unobserved linking variable
y⇤it, which represents the creditworthiness of a firm i and year t
y⇤it = x
0
i,t 1  + ✏it, (1)
where xi,t 1 represents the vector of observed explanatory variables of firm i
in year t   1 and   is a vector of slope coe cients. The variable Rit is the
rating category of firm i and year t. The linking variable y⇤it is continuous
and its range comprises the set of real numbers. In our study, we consider
seven di↵erent levels of credit ratings (i.e., AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B and
C). The variable Rit is assigned to 7 if firm i has a rating of AAA, 6 if AA,
5 if A, 4 if BBB, 3 if BB, 2 if B, and 1 if C in year t. Thus, the first stage
of our estimation maps the credit ratings into a partition of the unobserved
11
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linking variable y⇤it as follows:
Rit =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
7 if y⇤it 2 [µ6,1)
6 if y⇤it 2 [µ5, µ6)
5 if y⇤it 2 [µ4, µ5)
4 if y⇤it 2 [µ3, µ4)
3 if y⇤it 2 [µ2, µ3)
2 if y⇤it 2 [µ1, µ2)
1 if y⇤it 2 ( 1, µ1),
(2)
where µj are partition points independent of time t. Thresholds are not given
ex ante, but instead determined in the statistical procedure of estimating the
model.
Following the assumption that ✏it is normally and independently dis-
tributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1, which is ensured in the
estimation procedure, the probabilities for the di↵erent rating classes (given
xt 1) can be calculated according to:
P (Rit = j|xi,t 1) =  (µj   x0i,t 1 )   (µj 1   x0i,t 1 ), j = 1, ..., 7, (3)
with µ0 =  1 and µ7 =1.
We utilize the panel structure of the data for the model estimation. Both
a certain rating (i.e., a realization of Rit) and realizations of the input vari-
ables are ascribed to each company and each year during the observation
period. In order to represent the state of information when predictions for
the following period are calculated, all influence factors are lagged by one
period. Table 3 provides an overview of the input factors, boundaries, and
outputs of the estimated models. We estimate models for the North American
and European sample as well as on their merged dataset. We focus on three
di↵erent specifications of the CSP model, namely the ES model, the ENV
model, and the SOC model. Each variant includes the corresponding Asset4
score as indicated by their name plus control variables. In the merged es-
timation, also a region dummy and an interaction term between region and
CSP is further considered. The estimation is carried out by utilizing the
maximum likelihood method referring to ordered probit models (Venables
and Ripley, 2002; McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). To account for the panel
structure, we pool the observations and cluster standard errors on firm level,
which is appropriate for short panels. Wald p-values are calculated following
13
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Table 3: This table gives an overview of the estimated model specifications. The CSP
Models for isolated estimation of the regions North America and Europe include Asset4
and control variables while the Base Model includes only controls among their independent
variables. The boundaries that are required to assign rating classes depending on the
linear predictor are output of the regression. The Asset4 score represents either the equal
weighted ES rating, the environment, or the social score.
Regional Models Merged
Variable Category Variable Base Model CSP Model CSP Model
CSP Variables Asset4 Score x0 x0
Interaction North America & Asset4 Score x1
Region Variable North America Dummy x2
Control Variables Interest Coverage A x1 x1 x3
Interest Coverage B x2 x2 x4
Interest Coverage C x3 x3 x5
Interest Coverage D x4 x4 x6
Operating Margin x5 x5 x7
Long Term Debt x6 x6 x8
Total Debt x7 x7 x9
Market Capitalisation x8 x8 x10
Beta x9 x9 x11
Idiosyncratic Risk x10 x10 x12
Dividend Payer Dummy x11 x11 x13
Market/Book x12 x12 x14
Retained Earnings x13 x13 x15
Capital Expense x14 x14 x16
Cash Balance x15 x15 x17
Tangibility x16 x16 x18
Gross Domestic Product Growth x17 x17 x19
Dummy for Year 1 x18 x18 x20
(following Years analogue)
Boundaries Lower Boundary for Rating AAA µ6 µ6 µ6
Lower Boundary for Rating AA µ5 µ5 µ5
Lower Boundary for Rating A µ4 µ4 µ4
Lower Boundary for Rating BBB µ3 µ3 µ3
Lower Boundary for Rating BB µ2 µ2 µ2
Lower Boundary for Rating B µ1 µ1 µ1
Output Linear Predictor y⇤ y⇤ y⇤
Rating Class R R R
14
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the approach of Huber (1967) to reveal coe cient significance. Moreover, we
include estimated thresholds for the various rating levels and the goodness
of fit statistics McFadden R2. As the link function in ordered probit mod-
els limits the interpretation of the estimated coe cients, we also calculate
marginal e↵ects at means to capture the ceteris paribus impact of a marginal
change in the ES score on the credit rating prediction. The calculation is
based on all independent variables fixed at their means. To computationally
derive the marginal e↵ects, we follow Greene (2011).2 One objective of credit
portfolio models is to predict future credit ratings appropriately. In order to
determine the quality of the credit rating prediction of our model specifica-
tions, we calculate the Somers’ D values as a measure of correlation between
2Let x be the matrix of the independent variables. Then, the marginal e↵ects give an
indication of to which extent the probability of a firm being classified to a certain rating
classes changes based on the first derivative of the probabilities in Equation (3).
@P (Rit = 1|xi,t 1)
@xi,t 1
=      µ1   x0i,t 1   
@P (Rit = j|xi,t 1)
@xi,t 1
=
h
 
 
µj 1   x0i,t 1 
     (µj   x0it ) i , 8j 2 {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
@P (Rit = 7|xi,t 1)
@xi,t 1
=  
 
µ6   x0i,t 1 
 
 
15
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actual and predicted ratings.3
5. Empirical tests
The results of the regional and the merged models are reported in Table 4.
The estimation window for credit ratings in all of these probit models ranges
from 2003 to 2013. For the North American sample each of the three CSP
measures has a significantly positive coe cient. Thus, all else equal, firms
with a high level of CSP in the significant specifications have a higher prob-
ability of obtaining better credit ratings than firms with a low level of CSP.
In the European sample only the two specifications of the model with the
ES and SOC score manifest a significance of the respective CSP measure at
1% level. The ENV pillar provides no significant explanatory benefit for Eu-
rope in contrast to North America. The control variables display reasonable
signs in the regressions that are consistent with the findings of the literature
displayed in Section 3.2. To rule out the regionally di↵erent relations be-
tween CSP and credit ratings, we also provide a merged model of the North
American and the European sample with an interaction term between region
and CSP. The interpretation of an interaction e↵ect is more di cult as the
marginal e↵ect can even be of the opposite sign (Karaca-Mandic et al., 2012;
Ai and Norton, 2003). The results of our merged estimation are consistent
3According to Somers (1962), Somers’ D is a measure of ordinal association. For actual
ratings Z and predicted ratings Y , Newson (2001) define Somers’ D as following:
DY Z =
⌧(Z, Y )
⌧(Z,Z)
(4)
with Kendall rank correlation coe cient ⌧ :
⌧ =
NC  ND
n(n  1)/2 (5)
Kendall’s ⌧ is calculated by taking the di↵erence of the number of concordant pairs NC
and the number of discordant pairs ND as well as the sample size n. Two pairs (zi, yi)
and (zj , yj) are called concordant if the ranks of both elements agree, such as zi > zj
and yi > yj or if zi < zj and yi < yj . By contrast, two pairs are determined as being
discordant if zi > zj and yi < yj or if zi < zj and yi > yj . Somers’ D can take values from
 1 (only disagreeing pairs) to +1 (only agreeing pairs). In this context of measuring how
predicted and actual credit ratings are associated, the Somers’ D value of +1 expresses
the optimal case in which all predictions are actually confirmed.
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with the isolated regional estimations. ES and SOC score are relevant on the
same level in both regions as the coe cients of CSP scores are significant
while the interaction term between North America and CSP scores are not.
The ENV score, in contrast, is only relevant in North America as we docu-
ment no significant coe cient for ENV in general but a significant interaction
term between the North America dummy and the ENV score.
As the interpretation of coe cients is limited in terms of their magnitude,
we estimate the marginal e↵ect on the credit rating prediction of a change
in the CSP scores and present the results in Table 5. For North America, we
observe significant marginal e↵ects for all three CSP scores. The lower and
the upper triangular matrix for each score in Table 5 show a clear pattern
indicating that an increase in CSP scores significantly increases the proba-
bility of firms being rated at a higher rating level and reduces the probability
of the firms experiencing a rating downgrade. In particular, the marginal
e↵ects represent the di↵erence in predicted probabilities for each rating class
if ceteris paribus the mean CSP scores increase by 1%.
A detailed consideration of the diagonals shows that firms which are cur-
rently rated in rating levels AAA, AA and A also show a significantly higher
probability of being classified in the current rating level again, while it is less
likely for firms which are currently rated in rating level BBB and worse to
remain in the current rating level if the respective score is increased. For
the ES measure, for instance, the predicted probability of an A-rated North
American firm remaining in the A rating category is 0.277% higher for a
firm which has a 1% higher ES score compared with a firm that is other-
wise identical regarding the levels of the control variables. The probability
of a BBB-rated firm to obtain a rating upgrade increases per 1% ES score
by 0.330% (equaling the sum of probabilities to obtain the AAA, AA, or
A grade). In terms of absolute values, this emerges as an average saving
of approximately USD 1.45 with respect to Basel III economic capital per
loan nominal of USD 1,000 based on the ES score’s change of one standard
deviation (i.e., a saving of 14.5 basis points).4 For the European sample,
4This calculation is based on the internal ratings-based approach for general corporates
described in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017) on the time horizon of
one year. We assume the loss given default (LGD) rate to be 40% analogously to the
supervisory LGD for unsecured corporate exposure referring to the foundation approach.
Required probabilities of default are provided by U.S. average historic one-year corporate
rating transition rates (1981-2016) according to Standard&Poor’s (2017).
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the results for the ES score reveal that firms with a higher score have ce-
teris paribus a higher probability of remaining in the current credit rating
class (firms with current credit ratings AAA, AA and A), or even have an
increased probability of a rating migration into a better credit rating class
(firms across all current credit ratings). European firms with a current credit
rating of BBB, BB, B, or C are less likely to remain in the current credit
rating class. For instance, firms with current credit rating BBB exhibit a
decrease in the probability of remaining in credit rating BBB by 0.169% and
a decrease in the probability of experiencing a downgrade by one notch to
non-investment grade by 0.085% as well as an increase in the probability of
experiencing an upgrade to level A by 0.244%.
Table 6: This table reports on Somers’ D values for panels of North America and Europe
for predictions in the period from 2014 to 2017. Somers’ D is used in order to measure
correlation between predicted ratings and actual ratings. It can take values from  1 to
+1 while the latter is the optimal case in which all predictions are actually confirmed. We
display di↵erences between ES models’ Somers’ D and those of the base models in order
to show the improvement ascribed to CSP. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (WMW)
provides p-values in order to evaluate whether the probabilities of correct predictions are
significantly higher in the CSP models than in the benchmark model.
North America Europe
WMW p-value Somers’ D ref. Delta WMW p-value Somers’ D ref. Delta
Base Model 0.5968 0.5695
ES Model 0.0001 0.6050 0.0082 0.9778 0.5705 0.0010
ENV Model 0.0005 0.6048 0.0080 0.9530 0.5705 0.0009
SOC Model 0.0001 0.6027 0.0059 0.9396 0.5703 0.0008
# Observations 1608 454
Table 6 shows the results of the analysis of the prediction quality. A
positive value in the Delta columns in Table 6 indicates that incorporating
the respective CSP scores into the baseline model increases the prediction
quality. For instance, considering the ES score in our credit risk model in-
creases Somers’ D of the North American sample by 0.82%. We apply the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test on the probabilities that the actual
credit rating is predicted and find a p-value of 0.01% to show that the in-
crease is di↵erent from zero. Regarding the two single pillar scores, we find
likewise reasonable increases in Somers’ D. In particular for the ENV score,
the increases in Somers’ D of 0.80% is higher compared to the SOC model
(with 0.59%). In the European sample, none of the CSP models show any
relevant improvement in Somers’ D compared to the base model. Ensuing
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from the North American improvement in prediction quality for ES and SOC
and the significant coe cients for both measures for both regions, one would
expect similar results in Europe, but finds lower ones. This may depend on
the di↵ering CSP distribution amongst firms in these regions. According to
Table 3, the mean level of the ES score is, at 51.5%, lower in North America
than the European sample with 81.7%. Its standard deviation of 28.1% is
higher than its counterpart 15.8% in Europe. The median of 88.4%, com-
pared with the lower mean, indicates an ES distribution in Europe which
is skewed to the left. The SOC distribution is similar. In order to explain
regional deviations in the predictive performance, the variability of the sin-
gle CSP dimensions requires further considerations which we present in the
following section.
6. Discussion
As the ES score is an aggregation over the dimensions of ENV and SOC,
we next take a more thorough look at the e↵ects of these two dimensions.
6.1. Environmental regulation and credit ratings
The explanatory power of environment performance for credit ratings is
clearly shown for North America. Firms with good environment performance
are more likely to be rewarded with a better credit rating (Tables 4 to 5).
The prediction quality also increases by 0.8% (Table 6). In contrast, there is
no observable relevance of environment performance for Europe (Tables 4 to
6). To explain the observed di↵erence, we consider the structure of the ENV
score. It consists of three categories, namely resource reduction, emission
reduction, and product innovation. The awareness of resource and emission
reduction may be influenced by geological conditions. North America is en-
dowed with a broad abundance of natural resources. In contrast, Europe
lacks of this variety on commodities. As a result, the necessity to use re-
sources economically is higher in Europe. Further di↵erences are reflected
in the legislation of the two regions. Environmental regulations are weaker
in the U.S. than in many European countries such as Denmark and Sweden
(Johnstone et al., 2012). The willingness to accept binding environmental
protection agreements can be exemplified by considering the Kyoto Protocol
of 1997. It states reduction goals for greenhouse gases of 8% for the Euro-
pean community, but less for the United States (namely 7%), which have,
however, never ratified it (Kyoto Protocol, 1998). The Doha Amendment to
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the Kyoto Protocol has not yet been attended by the United States. The
di↵erent geographical and political circumstances between North America
and Europe are reflected in the di↵erent levels of the average ENV scores.
Dorfleitner et al. (2018) show that for the U.S., high ENV scores can pre-
dict positive earnings surprises in later periods, which can partially explain
the positive e↵ect on creditworthiness that we find for North America. Fi-
nally firms in North America have a higher degree of freedom in order to
di↵erentiate themselves from their peers with respect to environmental is-
sues compared to Europe, which results in explanatory and prediction power
improvements only for North America.
6.2. The benefits of social politics
In the credit rating regressions (Tables 4), the coe cient for social perfor-
mance is significant in both North America and Europe on a 1% level. More-
over, the marginal e↵ects analysis reveals a distinct increase in the probability
of both regions either maintaining their current rating or even migrating to
a better rating class (Table 5). As firms profit from high CSP by being able
to hire better qualified employees (Turban and Greening, 1997), it seems
intuitive that this is true in both North America and Europe. Besides im-
provements in explanatory power in North America, good social performance
results in significantly better credit rating predictions. The referring increase
of prediction quality amounts to 0.6% while the increase in Europe is only
0.1% (Table 6). Although prediction quality improves only in North America,
the impact of social performance is still confirmed for the European sample
based on the coe cient estimation and the marginal e↵ects. The di↵ering
prediction quality relevance of the SOC score between North America and
Europe is underpinned by the varying score levels between the two regions.
Referring to the descriptive statistics of our sample, the SOC score in North
America is distinctly lower than it is in Europe (58.7 vs. 85.7) while the vari-
ance is higher (standard deviation 27.6 vs. 14.4). Previous literature has, up
to now, identified di↵erences between both regions regarding many aspects of
the SOC score, such as employment quality, health and safety, training and
development, diversity and opportunity, community, and product responsibil-
ity. An important indicator is the social expense of a country. The U.S. and
Canada spent 19.2% and 17.0% of their GDP in 2014, respectively. European
countries such as France and Germany tend towards a higher level of expen-
diture (31.9% resp. 25.8%) (OECD, 2016). North America, respectively the
U.S., lacks a comprehensive labor market policy as opposed to Europe (Mat-
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ten and Moon, 2008) as well as labor unions with strong negotiating power
(Du Caju et al., 2009), good employment protection, and mandatory health
protection (Pfe↵er, 2010). Furthermore, the gender gap report of the World
Economic Forum WEF (2017), which analyzes the emancipation of women
and men regarding economic participation and opportunity, educational at-
tainment, health and survival, and political empowerment, shows that the
U.S. ranked 49th (worldwide), while many European countries such as Ger-
many (rank 12) do better. Strategies for human rights protection are more
common in Europe than in North America (Welford, 2005). Firms in North
America have a higher degree of freedom in order to di↵erentiate themselves
from their peers with respect to social issues. Furthermore the diversifica-
tion of the European firms in terms of social performance decreased between
the in-sample period and the out-of-sample period (standard deviation 17.0
vs. 14.4). The high basic level and decreasing variability of social scores in
Europe lead to a certain degree of similarity among firms, which explains
insignificant results in our prediction models despite increased explanatory
power.
7. Robustness checks
This section contains several robustness checks to rule out the fact that
our results may be driven by our methodological framework, the sample
selection, a missing data bias, a local bias, or a time period bias.
We analyze whether the general risk-level of firms a↵ects the impact of
CSP ratings on credit ratings and cluster firms into an investment grade and
a non-investment grade (speculative) group. The marginal e↵ects in Table 5
show that the impact of CSP on credit rating predictions di↵ers across rat-
ing classes. The better the initial rating class of a firm is, the smaller the
conditional probability by which an increase in the ES score predicts a better
credit rating (except for rating class C). The results for single pillars (ENV
and SOC) show similar patterns to the ES results. In Europe, we also find
comparable evidence as in North America for the SOC pillar score which
alone appears significant there. Also previous studies show di↵erences be-
tween the impact of CSP on the cluster of investment grade ratings and on
non-investment grade ratings. In the U.S., for specific CSP factors (such as
the percentage of independent directors from the corporate governance di-
mension) the significance of the impact on credit ratings diminishes when re-
stricting the sample to investment grade bonds only (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,
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2006). Therefore, we re-estimate our models based on the investment grade
sub-sample of our analysis. The results are contained in Tables B.9–B.10
in the appendix. The levels of significance in the investment grade subset
decrease, certainly to some extent due to the smaller number of observations.
We document lacking improvements of prediction quality in North America
compared with the full sample (Table B.10, Panel A), while the improvement
from the entire sample is 0.82% (see Table 6).
Since endogenous CSP ratings may generate reverse causality issues, we
replace firm ES ratings by industry-based ES ratings ranks and rerun our
analyses. The overview of industry classes of our data is presented in Ta-
ble B.8. The absolute range of possible CSP activities can vary across indus-
tries. In order to address systematic di↵erences across industries, we follow
Utz (2018) and modify the Asset4 CSP ratings. First, firms in each industry
are ranked by their Asset4 score. Second, each firm is assigned its percentile
score within the respective industry. Hence the best CSP performing firm
in each industry holds a value of 1 and the lowest CSP performing firm a
zero. Overall, the credit-rating explanation quality in terms of significance of
explanatory variables remains the same (Table B.9) and has thus compatible
implications as our main results. The Somers’ D improvement has a lower
magnitude (Table B.10). However, the decrease compared to the normal case
amounts only to 0.13% for ES when utilities are excluded as the model can-
not capture all relevant e↵ects of this industry class. The results show that
the loss of information (the original distance between firms with respect to
their CSP ratings) results in lower improvement of the prediction quality.
Furthermore, the standard model in literature does not contain industry
fixed e↵ects (Dimitrov et al., 2015). After adding industry fixed e↵ects to
our main model, coe cient significance levels for North America and Europe
remain unchanged. The Somers’ D values decrease at first glance but remain
again comparable if we exclude utilities (see Table B.10).
We capture a possible e↵ect on the results of excluded observations due to
the lacking data of control variables. Instead of discarding these observations,
we substitute lacking values by the mean according to the mean imputation
method (Schafer, 1997). When rerunning our regressions, we find the same
significance of the Asset4 scores (Table B.9) and even higher Somers’ D
improvements (Table B.10).
Moreover, we restrict our North American sample (5,393 observations) to
a U.S. sample (4,849 observations) with respect to the assumption that the
underlying drivers for credit rating predictions are more homogeneous inside
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the domestic market compared to the region. Again, we observe no relevant
changes in the significance of the CSP scores (Table B.9). The impact of
CSP on the credit-rating prediction quality even increases to 1.0% for ENV
and to 0.7% for SOC (Table B.10).
Finally, we check the robustness of results according to changes in the
observation period for the parameter estimation panel and the prediction
data set. The main results are based on a period covering observations
between 2003 and 2013 while the prediction data set includes observations
from 2014 to 2017. In order to increase the number of observations in the
prediction data set, we reduce the considered years in the estimation data set
in favor of the prediction data set. We choose the estimation data set lasting
until 2011 and 2012 with the prediction data set commencing accordingly in
2012 and 2013, respectively. Overall there is no major di↵erence regarding
the significances of the scores (Table B.9) and the improvement of credit-
rating prediction quality by considering CSP (Table B.10).
8. Conclusion
One central question in the finance literature addresses the prediction
quality of credit ratings (Blume et al., 1998; Kisgen, 2006). CSP is an ad-
ditional informational proxy for factors that reduce firm risk, as shown in
several studies such as Kim et al. (2014); Utz (2018). Therefore, we inves-
tigate whether, how, and to what extent the integration of CSP measures
in credit rating predictions improves their quality. The relationship between
CSP and credit ratings is significantly positive increases in North America,
i.e., high CSP performance goes along with better credit ratings. Addition-
ally, out-of-sample predictions are improved by 0.8%. In Europe, the social
score adds informational power to a basic prediction model while the environ-
mental performance does not. In general, the regional di↵ering impact of the
environment performance presumably is due to regional di↵erences in both
economic areas, such as stronger existing legal and cultural frameworks. To
embed our results in a theoretical framework, our findings show supporting
evidence of the risk mitigation view of high CSP.
We resolve contrary results of earlier studies by generating comparable
findings for an international sample consisting of North America and Eu-
rope. Our results are based on a consistent identification of the explanatory
power and the quantification of the prediction quality of CSP dimensions
for both regions. In particular, our study contributes an analysis of single
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dimensions environment, social performance and their aggregate to the find-
ings of Stellner et al. (2015). While Stellner et al. (2015) show that (aggre-
gated) CSP has no impact on credit ratings of European firms, we ascertain
that the social performance is a significant explanatory factor for the credit
ratings. Moreover, we confirm the findings of Jiraporn et al. (2014) that
North American firms with high CSP obtain better credit ratings although
our study distinguishes itself by using the methodological more sophisticated
Asset4 scores (cf. Humphrey et al., 2012). We complement this study by
quantifying the improvement of the prediction quality, i.e., particularly 0.8%
points for North America, which is economically significant with respect to
less required economic capital. Overall, we find supporting evidence that the
impact of CSP performance on credit ratings is independent of the sustain-
ability rating agency in North America and Europe.
Since the country level of CSP is of importance in the relationship between
CSP and creditworthiness (Stellner et al., 2015), future research may extend
our study to di↵erent regions. This is particularly interesting, since Utz
(2018) finds evidence for crash risk evidence of the fact that – consistent with
our results – the risk mitigation view holds in North America and Europe,
however the over-investment hypothesis applies in the region of Asia Pacific.
As this study focuses rather on the technical e↵ect for credit risk models, a
further extension of this research could be to dig deeper into the economic
channels through which the observed e↵ects causally emerge.
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Appendix A. Information on input variables
Table A.7: Description of control variables. Source: Worldscope and Thomson Reuters
Datastream
Variable Definition
Interest coverage Earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expense
on debt. Negative values of this ratio are floored at zero. Any
3-year average above 100 is capped at 100. The nonlinear
form of interest coverage in this model is taken into account
by categorizing the ratio according to the interval of (0-5)
in sub-variable A, (5-10) in sub-variable B, (10-20) in sub-
variable C, and (20-100) in sub-variable D.
Operating margin 3-year averages of operating income divided by net sales or
revenues
Long term debt leverage 3-year averages of long-term debt divided by total capital
Total debt leverage 3-year averages of the sum of long-term and short-term debt
(including current portion of long-term debt) divided by the
sum of total capital and short-term debt
Market capitalization Percentile of the referring company’s market capitalization
among those of NYSE listed companies
Idiosyncratic risk Root mean squared error from a regression of a company’s
stock returns with the local market index returns as a bench-
mark. The regression made for each firm at the time horizon
of one year is based on daily stock, respectively index re-
turns. At least 50 observations per year are required to be
made available for this calculation.
Beta - systematic risk Market model beta from the above described market model
regression to calculate idiosyncratic risk
Dividend payer Dummy variable which takes 1 if a company has positive div-
idends per share in the referring year and 0 otherwise
Market-to-book Ordinary (common) equity divided by the balance sheet value
of the ordinary (common) equity in the company
Retained earnings Retained earnings divided by total assets. Retained earnings
reflect the accumulated after-tax earnings of the company
which have not been distributed as dividends to shareholders
or allocated to a reserve account.
Capital expenditures Capital expenditures divided by last year’s total assets
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Cash balances Sum of cash and short-term investments divided by total as-
sets
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment (gross property, plant, and
equipment less accumulated reserves for depreciation, deple-
tion, and amortization) divided by total assets.
Appendix B. Additional tables
Table B.8: This table reports on industry classes. Although we follow Dimitrov et al.
(2015) by omitting explicit industry e↵ects, we cover this topic in the discussion section.
We run two respective models. The first model includes the rank percentiles of the Asset4
score within each industry while the second includes industry fixed e↵ects.
North America Europe
2003-2013 2014-2017 2003-2013 2014-2017
Basic Materials 271 163 152 67
Consumer Goods 520 234 112 56
Consumer Services 680 256 184 53
Healthcare 317 103 57 16
Oil and Gas 478 272 58 36
Technology 279 99 35 9
Utilities 330 128 208 66
Telecommunications 109 33 100 34
Industry 801 320 352 117
Total 3785 1608 1258 454
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Table B.9: This table displays the estimation results of the ordered probit models in the
discussion section for the panels of North America and Europe. Estimation is carried
out by utilizing the maximum likelihood method referring to ordered probit models. Co-
e cients of all variables are displayed including the significance level marked by stars.
Coe cients are regarded as being significant on the level of 1%, 5%, or 10% if the p-value
is below these levels. The Hosmer-Lemeshow Test and MacFadden R2 are calculated in
order to evaluate the models’ goodness of fit. High p-values indicate a su cient fit because
the null hypothesis stating that the model’s fit cannot be rejected. MacFadden R2 can
take values between 0 and 1 while the latter indicates perfect model fit.
Model Coe cient Base ES ENV SOC
Panel A: Models including only investment grade
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.001 0.002  0.001
Panel Europe Asset4 Coe cient 0.011 0.004 0.012⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient 0.007 0.004 0.006
Asset4 * North America  0.005  0.002  0.006
North America  0.687⇤⇤⇤  0.214  0.485  0.183
# Observations 3726
Panel B: Models with Asset4 industry percentiles
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.024⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.023⇤⇤⇤
Panel Europe Asset4 Coe cient 0.027⇤⇤⇤ 0.011 0.036⇤⇤⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient  0.016⇤⇤  0.024⇤⇤⇤  0.003
Asset4 * North America 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤
North America  0.655⇤⇤⇤  1.848⇤⇤⇤  1.888⇤⇤⇤  1.433⇤⇤⇤
# Observations 5043
Panel C: Models with Asset4 industry percentiles excl. utilies
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.024⇤⇤⇤ 0.030⇤⇤⇤
Panel Europe Asset4 Coe cient 0.016 0.003 0.025⇤⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient  0.018⇤⇤  0.022⇤⇤⇤  0.009
Asset4 * North America 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤
North America  0.500⇤⇤⇤  1.824⇤⇤⇤  1.719⇤⇤⇤  1.513⇤⇤⇤
# Observations 4505
Panel D: Models with industry fixed e↵ects
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤
Panel Europe Asset4 Coe cient 0.015⇤⇤⇤ 0.007 0.017⇤⇤⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient 0.007⇤⇤ 0.003 0.008⇤⇤
Asset4 * North America 0.007⇤ 0.007⇤⇤ 0.005
North America  0.522⇤⇤⇤  0.767⇤⇤⇤  0.900⇤⇤⇤  0.631⇤⇤
# Observations 5043
Panel E: Models with industry fixed e↵ects excl. utilities
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.015⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤
Panel Europe Asset4 Coe cient 0.007 0.000 0.012⇤⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient 0.003 0.001 0.004
Asset4 * North America 0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤
North America  0.352⇤⇤⇤  0.965⇤⇤⇤  0.984⇤⇤⇤  0.836⇤⇤⇤
# Observations 4505
Panel F: Models with controls imputed
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤
Panel Europe Asset4 Coe cient 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.004 0.017⇤⇤⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤
Asset4 * North America 0.004 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.001
North America  0.659⇤⇤⇤  0.704⇤⇤⇤  0.976⇤⇤⇤  0.474⇤
# Observations 5409
Panel G: Models with the North American observations restricted to U.S.
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.004 0.011⇤⇤⇤
Asset4 * North America 0.004 0.007⇤⇤ 0.002
North America  0.667⇤⇤⇤  0.709⇤⇤  0.952⇤⇤⇤  0.524⇤
# Observations 4701
Panel H: Models with shorter estimation period 2002-2012 and longer prediction period 2013-2016
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤
Panel Europe Asset4 Coe cient 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.005 0.015⇤⇤⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤
Asset4 * North America 0.003 0.005⇤ 0.001
North America  0.633⇤⇤⇤  0.572⇤⇤  0.784⇤⇤⇤  0.452
# Observations 4501
Panel I: Models with shorter estimation period 2002-2011 and longer prediction period 2012-2016
Panel North America Asset4 Coe cient 0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤
Panel Europe Asset4 Coe cient 0.012⇤⇤ 0.005 0.014⇤⇤⇤
Merged Estimation Asset4 Coe cient 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤
Asset4 * North America 0.002 0.004 0.000
North America  0.596⇤⇤⇤  0.480  0.707⇤⇤⇤  0.370
# Observations 3958
⇤⇤⇤ significant on 1% level, ⇤⇤ significant on 5% level, ⇤ significant on 10% level
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Table B.10: This table reports on Somers’ D values as a measure of the correlation between
predicted ratings and actual ratings for panels of North America and Europe covering the
years from 2014 to 2017 (if not explicitly noted otherwise). Somers’ D is used in order to
measure the correlation between predicted ratings and actual ratings. It can take values
from  1 to +1 while the latter is the optimal case in which all predictions are actually
confirmed. We display di↵erences between ES models’ Somers’ D and those of the base
models in order to exhibit the improvement ascribed to CSP.
North America Europe
WMW p-Value Somers’ D Delta Somers’ D WMW p-Value Somers’ D Delta Somers’ D
Panel A: Models including only investment grade
Base Model 0.3715 0.4180
ES Model 0.4415 0.3714  0.0001 1.0000 0.4133  0.0048
ENV Model 0.2200 0.3716 0.0002 1.0000 0.4168  0.0012
SOC Model 0.2158 0.3716 0.0001 0.9999 0.4118  0.0062
# Observations 888 335
Panel B: Models with Asset4 industry percentiles
Base Model 0.5968 0.5695
ES Model 0.0005 0.6008 0.0040 0.9981 0.5691  0.0005
ENV Model 0.0165 0.6002 0.0034 0.9950 0.5698 0.0003
SOC Model 0.0000 0.6002 0.0034 0.9877 0.5683  0.0012
# Observations 1608 454
Panel C: Models with Asset4 industry percentiles excl. utilities
Base Model 0.6267 0.6278
ES Model 0.0001 0.6336 0.0069 1.0000 0.6273  0.0005
ENV Model 0.0048 0.6328 0.0061 0.9996 0.6278 0.0001
SOC Model 0.0000 0.6325 0.0058 0.9997 0.6264  0.0014
# Observations 1480 388
Panel D: Models with industry fixed e↵ects
Base Model 0.6157 0.5935
ES Model 0.0002 0.6221 0.0064 1.0000 0.5922  0.0013
ENV Model 0.0053 0.6214 0.0057 0.9999 0.5935 0.0001
SOC Model 0.0001 0.6208 0.0051 0.9997 0.5916  0.0019
# Observations 1608 454
Panel E: Models with industry fixed e↵ects excl. utilities
Base Model 0.6339 0.6379
ES Model 0.0001 0.6425 0.0086 1.0000 0.6374  0.0004
ENV Model 0.0038 0.6416 0.0077 0.9978 0.6379 0.0000
SOC Model 0.0000 0.6408 0.0069 0.9998 0.6365  0.0014
# Observations 1480 388
Panel F: Models with controls imputed
Base Model 0.5903 0.5672
ES Model 0.0000 0.5995 0.0092 0.9983 0.5672  0.0001
ENV Model 0.0001 0.5999 0.0095 0.9876 0.5676 0.0003
SOC Model 0.0000 0.5965 0.0062 0.9871 0.5669  0.0004
# Observations 1698 485
Panel G: Models with the North American observations restricted to U.S.
Base Model 0.5590
ES Model 0.0000 0.5687 0.0097
ENV Model 0.0000 0.5693 0.0103
SOC Model 0.0003 0.5661 0.0071
# Observations 1406
Panel H: Models with shorter estimation period 2002-2012 and longer prediction period 2013-2016
Base Model 0.5938 0.5759
ES Model 0.0000 0.6019 0.0081 0.1640 0.5757  0.0001
ENV Model 0.0000 0.6018 0.0080 0.4880 0.5760 0.0002
SOC Model 0.0000 0.5995 0.0057 0.0175 0.5761 0.0002
# Observations 2024 580
Panel I: Models with shorter estimation period 2002-2011 and longer prediction period 2012-2016
Base Model 0.5915 0.5591
ES Model 0.0007 0.5998 0.0082 0.7589 0.5579  0.0012
ENV Model 0.0041 0.5998 0.0083 0.9585 0.5587  0.0004
SOC Model 0.0003 0.5973 0.0057 0.1433 0.5584  0.0007
# Observations 2441 706
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